為什么中國高鐵建設(shè)成本如此低廉
Why China can build high-speed rail so cheaply譯文簡介
在不到10年的時間里,中國已經(jīng)建成了總長超過10000公里的高速鐵路網(wǎng)。其他國家的高速網(wǎng)絡(luò)相比相形見絀,甚至整個歐盟的高速網(wǎng)絡(luò)都相形見絀。不僅如此,為了建造這些,中國花費的代價僅為其他國家花費的三分之二甚至更少。
正文翻譯
In under a decade, China has built a high-speed rail network totalling more than 10,000km. It eclipses every other country’s high-speed network and even that of the entire European unx. Not only that, to build it China spent two-thirds or less what other countries have spent.
在不到10年的時間里,中國已經(jīng)建成了總長超過10000公里的高速鐵路網(wǎng)。其他國家的高速網(wǎng)絡(luò)相比相形見絀,甚至整個歐盟的高速網(wǎng)絡(luò)都相形見絀。不僅如此,為了建造這些,中國花費的代價僅為其他國家花費的三分之二甚至更少。
According to a World Bank paper published last week, China’s high-speed rail so far has cost between $17m and $21m per kilometre, even though it has a high ratio of big-ticket viaducts and tunnels. In Europe that figure is $25m-$39m per kilometre, while in California, the only US state currently planning a high-speed line, it’s more like $56m/km.
世界銀行(World Bank)上周發(fā)表的一篇論文稱,中國高鐵每公里造價在1700萬至2100萬美元之間。在歐洲,每公里造價為2500萬至3900萬美元,而在美國目前唯一一個規(guī)劃高速線路的州——加州,其每公里造價為5600萬美元。
世界銀行(World Bank)上周發(fā)表的一篇論文稱,中國高鐵每公里造價在1700萬至2100萬美元之間。在歐洲,每公里造價為2500萬至3900萬美元,而在美國目前唯一一個規(guī)劃高速線路的州——加州,其每公里造價為5600萬美元。
Some of the reasons are not surprising. For instance, in a country where according to the World Bank 978 million people lived on less than $5 a day in 2008, labour has been cheap.
其中一些原因并不奇怪。例如,根據(jù)世界銀行(worldbank)的數(shù)據(jù)顯示,在這樣一個國家:2008年仍然有9.78億人每天生活費不足5美元,其勞動力一直很便宜。
其中一些原因并不奇怪。例如,根據(jù)世界銀行(worldbank)的數(shù)據(jù)顯示,在這樣一個國家:2008年仍然有9.78億人每天生活費不足5美元,其勞動力一直很便宜。
And in an authoritarian state like China, the cost of moving people out of the way is low. The paper’s authors note that site work and right-of-way costs in litigious California are around $10m/km, or 17.6% of the total cost, while in China land acquisition and resettlement costs are below 8% of project cost.
而在中國這樣的**國家,轉(zhuǎn)移民眾的成本很低。論文作者指出,在加州,工地工作及通行權(quán)(拆遷)成本約為1000萬美元/公里,占總成本的17.6%,而在中國,土地征用和移民安置成本低于項目成本的8%。
而在中國這樣的**國家,轉(zhuǎn)移民眾的成本很低。論文作者指出,在加州,工地工作及通行權(quán)(拆遷)成本約為1000萬美元/公里,占總成本的17.6%,而在中國,土地征用和移民安置成本低于項目成本的8%。
But other reasons may be more interesting both to the developed world and to regions like Africa that are sorely in need of transformative infrastructure.
但對于發(fā)達國家和非洲等迫切需要變革性基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的地區(qū)來說,其他原因可能更令人感興趣。
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但對于發(fā)達國家和非洲等迫切需要變革性基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的地區(qū)來說,其他原因可能更令人感興趣。
原創(chuàng)翻譯:龍騰網(wǎng) http://mintwatchbillionaireclub.com 轉(zhuǎn)載請注明出處
For one thing, the sheer scale of China’s rail programme and the state’s firm commitment to it unleashed the country’s technical and manufacturing capabilities. The declaration of a credible plan to build 10,000 km of high-speed rail over six to seven years energised the construction and equipment supply community, the paper says. Assured of very high volumes, companies and state institutions ramped up capacity quickly and invested in innovative techniques.
一方面,中國鐵路項目的巨大規(guī)模和國家對此項目的堅定承諾“釋放”了中國的技術(shù)和制造能力。該報說,宣布一項可信的計劃,在6至7年內(nèi)修建1萬公里的高鐵,為建筑和設(shè)備供應(yīng)界注入了活力。由于產(chǎn)量非常高,公司和國家機構(gòu)迅速提高了產(chǎn)能,并投資于創(chuàng)新技術(shù)。
一方面,中國鐵路項目的巨大規(guī)模和國家對此項目的堅定承諾“釋放”了中國的技術(shù)和制造能力。該報說,宣布一項可信的計劃,在6至7年內(nèi)修建1萬公里的高鐵,為建筑和設(shè)備供應(yīng)界注入了活力。由于產(chǎn)量非常高,公司和國家機構(gòu)迅速提高了產(chǎn)能,并投資于創(chuàng)新技術(shù)。
“This,” writes Gerald Ollivier, a World Bank senior transport specialist and paper co-author, “has led to lower unit costs as a result of the development of competitive multiple local sources for construction (earthworks, bridges, tunnels, EMU trains etc.) that adopted mechanization in construction and manufacturing.
世界銀行高級運輸專家、論文合著者杰拉爾德·奧利維爾(Gerald Ollivier)寫道:“這導(dǎo)致了單位成本的降低,這是由于在建筑和制造業(yè)采用機械化的多種具有競爭力的當(dāng)?shù)亟ㄖY源(土方工程、橋梁、隧道、動車組列車等)的發(fā)展。
世界銀行高級運輸專家、論文合著者杰拉爾德·奧利維爾(Gerald Ollivier)寫道:“這導(dǎo)致了單位成本的降低,這是由于在建筑和制造業(yè)采用機械化的多種具有競爭力的當(dāng)?shù)亟ㄖY源(土方工程、橋梁、隧道、動車組列車等)的發(fā)展。
“Further, large volumes and the ability to amortize capital investment in high-cost construction equipment over a number of projects contributed to the lowering of unit costs.”
“此外,數(shù)量龐大以及能夠?qū)⒏叱杀窘ㄖO(shè)備的資本投資分?jǐn)偟饺舾身椖恐?,有助于降低單位成本。?/b>
“此外,數(shù)量龐大以及能夠?qū)⒏叱杀窘ㄖO(shè)備的資本投資分?jǐn)偟饺舾身椖恐?,有助于降低單位成本。?/b>
The Chinese government also has the clout to standardise designs – for embankments, track, viaducts, electrification, signalling and communication systems – which cuts cost and duplication of effort.
中國也有能力將路堤、軌道、高架橋、電氣化、信號和通信系統(tǒng)的設(shè)計標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化,從而降低成本和重復(fù)勞動。
中國也有能力將路堤、軌道、高架橋、電氣化、信號和通信系統(tǒng)的設(shè)計標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化,從而降低成本和重復(fù)勞動。
It also standardised construction techniques. Here, the paper’s authors admired the Chinese approach to viaducts. China built a lot of these to save scarce farmland or to leap over rivers and, even though they are expensive to build, the cost was kept down by standardising the design and manufacture of viaduct bridge beams.
它還使施工技術(shù)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化。在這里,該報的作者對中國人修建高架橋的做法表示贊賞。中國建造了很多這樣的橋梁是為了節(jié)省稀缺的農(nóng)田或跨越河流,盡管建造成本很高,但通過標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化高架橋梁的設(shè)計和制造來降低成本。
它還使施工技術(shù)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化。在這里,該報的作者對中國人修建高架橋的做法表示贊賞。中國建造了很多這樣的橋梁是為了節(jié)省稀缺的農(nóng)田或跨越河流,盡管建造成本很高,但通過標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化高架橋梁的設(shè)計和制造來降低成本。
Their span is standardised at either 24m or 32m and they are cast in temporary factories set up along the railway alignment. Each beam is transported no more than 8km by a specially-designed vehicle with up to 18 axles.
其跨度標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化為24m或32m,并在鐵路沿線設(shè)立的臨時工廠中澆筑。每根梁的運輸距離不超過8公里,由一輛專門設(shè)計的車輛(最多18根車軸)完成。
其跨度標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化為24m或32m,并在鐵路沿線設(shè)立的臨時工廠中澆筑。每根梁的運輸距離不超過8公里,由一輛專門設(shè)計的車輛(最多18根車軸)完成。
It was China’s handling of tunnels, however, that most impressed Ollivier et al. They noted that the Chinese system for tunnel construction resulted in a unit cost of $10m to $15m per kilometre, a fraction of what it costs New Zealand ($43m), the US ($50m), and Australia ($60m). The system allowed China to tunnel fast, as well, at a rate of five to 10 metres per day.
然而,給奧利維爾等人留下最深刻印象的是中國對隧道的處理方式。他們指出,中國的隧道建設(shè)系統(tǒng)導(dǎo)致了每公里1000萬至1500萬美元的單位成本,僅為新西蘭(4300萬美元)、美國(5000萬美元)和澳大利亞(6000萬美元)成本的一小部分。這一系統(tǒng)也使中國能夠以每天5至10米的速度快速挖掘隧道
然而,給奧利維爾等人留下最深刻印象的是中國對隧道的處理方式。他們指出,中國的隧道建設(shè)系統(tǒng)導(dǎo)致了每公里1000萬至1500萬美元的單位成本,僅為新西蘭(4300萬美元)、美國(5000萬美元)和澳大利亞(6000萬美元)成本的一小部分。這一系統(tǒng)也使中國能夠以每天5至10米的速度快速挖掘隧道
It’s little wonder, given its remarkable high-speed rail feat, that China is exporting its rail construction expertise all over the world, especially to Africa, and is even keen to help build the UK’s first significant high-speed rail network, dubbed HS2.
毫無疑問,鑒于其卓越的高鐵成就,中國正在向全世界,特別是非洲輸出其鐵路建設(shè)專業(yè)知識,甚至熱衷于幫助英國建設(shè)第一個重要的高鐵網(wǎng)絡(luò),即為高鐵2號。
毫無疑問,鑒于其卓越的高鐵成就,中國正在向全世界,特別是非洲輸出其鐵路建設(shè)專業(yè)知識,甚至熱衷于幫助英國建設(shè)第一個重要的高鐵網(wǎng)絡(luò),即為高鐵2號。
But could the benefits of the Chinese approach be realised in big, decentralised regions, like the Gulf, Africa as a whole, or the United States? It seems unlikely.
但是,中國方法的好處能否在大而分散的地區(qū)實現(xiàn),比如海灣地區(qū)、整個非洲或美國?這似乎不太可能。
但是,中國方法的好處能否在大而分散的地區(qū)實現(xiàn),比如海灣地區(qū)、整個非洲或美國?這似乎不太可能。
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According to a World Bank paper published last week, China’s high-speed rail so far has cost between $17m and $21m per kilometre, even though it has a high ratio of big-ticket viaducts and tunnels. In Europe that figure is $25m-$39m per kilometre, while in California, the only US state currently planning a high-speed line, it’s more like $56m/km. The World Bank Paper should also provide [if not provided] similar information for Malaysia where the announced cost per KM for the KL-Spore HSR Project with just 330km distance is is suspected to much higher. The information could dispel/indicate any suspicion of corruption in the award of the contract for which China is a major competitor and China has been the leading bidder for other Railway Projects in Malaysia.
根據(jù)世界銀行(World Bank)上周發(fā)表的一份報告,迄今為止,中國高鐵每公里的成本在1700萬至2100萬美元之間,盡管中國高鐵中造價高昂的高架橋和隧道比例很高。在歐洲,這一數(shù)字為每公里2500萬至3900萬美元,而在美國目前唯一計劃建設(shè)高鐵的加州,這一數(shù)字更接近于每公里5600萬美元。世界銀行的論文也應(yīng)該為馬來西亞提供(如果沒有提供的話)類似的信息。馬來西亞宣布的kl 高鐵項目每公里的成本據(jù)懷疑要高得多,該項目距離只有330公里。中國是馬來西亞鐵路項目的主要競爭對手,而且中國一直是馬來西亞其他鐵路項目的主要競標(biāo)者。
Until The U.S. gets serious about transportation by developing a policy challenging the almost total reliance on the automobile and creating an infrastructure bank, we will further erode our world standing, not to mention our quality of life.
除非美國認(rèn)真對待交通問題,制定一項政策以挑戰(zhàn)幾乎完全依賴汽車的現(xiàn)狀,并創(chuàng)建一家基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施銀行,否則我們的世界地位將進一步受到侵蝕,更不用說我們的生活質(zhì)量了。
In last 15 years, rapid infrastructure development has taken place & hence there is no dearth of middle age (15 years+) Engineers possessing above experiences to be posted at project sites & having career prospects to do innovation work as well. Retired Govt. Engineers (between 60-65 years) by and large do not posses experience, expertise, focus, passion, innovation, stamina, zeal & enthusiasms etc. which is renderings non durable & inefficient transport/ bridge infrastructures. Hence they should not be recruited / mobilized at project sites. Specialists/experts can be taken as advisors. There is no integrity anywhere even after signing Integrity Pact by Contractor, Client & Consultant. Ministry & Client has introduced multiple level consultants such as Design Consultant, Proof Consultant, Safely Consultant, External Auditor, and Supervision Consultant. But what is happening that all are sitting under one table & simply stamping is done. Even highway professor/personnel are signing bridge design & drawing. Construction drawings are different from AS- Built drawing. Specifications, codes, clauses, systems, procedures are there in plenty. But it is this lack of integrity, expertise, professionalism, focus, passion, innovation, involvement, excellence, strong willed etc. which has killed everything everywhere. This MANAGING business has killed quality, durability factors of infrastructure (specifically Transport Infrastructures) in the country. We are only after obtaining degrees for our stomach & prestige. So who is to blame in particular & who will come forward to do the value addition? Only turnover and number of projects running on loans have not much significance. Consultants are increasingly being appointed on the basis of lowest fees. They are treated like contractors and are required to pay earnest money. Do clients ever dare follow such an approach while sexting a lawyer, a surgeon or a chartered accountant? Let us not lose sight of the fact that we are way behind China. Today we have the biggest mountain of debt in the history of the world and we can’t even afford to repair what we already have. In Bihar, on river Ganges alone some 6 nos. bridges are there & dozen bridges are coming up. Almost dozen bridges are there on other rivers. Looking into the supervision & construction standards, how much durability can be expected? Can we expect the durability of more than 150 years old Koilwar Bridge on Sone river or 117 years old Nehru Setu on Sone river in Dehri- on - Sone. Bridges built by British are still sound & under operations & bridges built by us are falling down & we are amending codes after codes. Our roads, bridges and rail are outdated and need to be fixed. Bihar is having maximum nos. of mega bridges. Can we expect that these bridges will exist in year 2100 & afterwards? Is India Building Bridges to Ruin?
在過去的15年里,基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施發(fā)展迅速,因此不乏擁有上述經(jīng)驗的中年(從業(yè)15年以上)工程師,他們也有從事創(chuàng)新工作的職業(yè)前景。退休的政府工程師(60-65歲)總體上不具備經(jīng)驗、專業(yè)知識、專注力、激情、創(chuàng)新、耐力、熱情和熱情等,導(dǎo)致交通/橋梁基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)效率低下和不耐用。因此,不應(yīng)在項目地點征聘他們。專家可以作為顧問。即使在承包商、客戶和顧問簽署了誠信協(xié)議之后,任何地方都沒有誠信可言。
公司引進了設(shè)計顧問、證明顧問、安全顧問、外聘審核員、監(jiān)理顧問等多層次顧問。但是所有人都坐在一張桌子邊,發(fā)生了什么只需桌子下面跺下腳就行。甚至連公路教授都在簽署橋梁設(shè)計和圖紙。施工圖不同于竣工圖。說明書、代碼、條款、系統(tǒng)、程序應(yīng)有盡有。但正是這種缺乏誠信、專業(yè)知識、專業(yè)精神、專注、激情、創(chuàng)新、參與、卓越、堅強意志等,才扼殺了一切。這種管理業(yè)務(wù)的方式降低了該國基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施(特別是交通基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施)的質(zhì)量和耐久性因素。我們獲得學(xué)位只是為了我們的收入和聲譽。那么誰是罪魁禍?zhǔn)?只有營業(yè)額和貸款項目的數(shù)量沒有太大的意義越來越多的顧問們被以最低的費用來任命。他們被當(dāng)作承包商對待,并被要求支付定金。
客戶在選擇律師、外科醫(yī)生或注冊會計師時,是否敢這樣做?讓我們不要忽視我們遠遠落后中國的事實。今天,我們背負(fù)著世界歷史上最大的債務(wù),我們甚至無力修復(fù)我們已經(jīng)擁有的債務(wù)。在比哈爾邦,僅恒河上就有6座大橋,還有12座即將建成。那里的其他河流上有十幾座橋??纯幢O(jiān)理和施工標(biāo)準(zhǔn),預(yù)計耐久性能達到多少?我們能期待索內(nèi)河上150多年歷史的科伊爾瓦橋,還是Sone河上117年歷史的尼赫魯·塞圖橋的耐久性呢?英國人建的橋仍然完好,一直在運營中,我們建的橋倒了,我們在一個接一個地修改規(guī)范。我們的道路、橋梁和鐵路都過時了,需要修理。比哈爾邦擁有最多的大橋。我們能期待這些橋在2100年或以后仍然存在嗎?難道印度正在建造通向毀滅的橋梁嗎?
As a developing nation, rapid development of transport infrastructure is happening in India like some other developing countries. The eye-popping structures have slashed travel times in some areas, made business easier and generated a sizable slice of the country’s economy, laying a foundation, in theory at least, for decades of future growth. But as an Engineer my concern is about development/ construction of robust & durable transport infrastructures. The shortsightedness of development policies are gnawing at the foundations of bridges in the country. sextion of construction agencies is more of the client’s requirement but where its implementation is concerned, where supervision & quality assurance is concerned, our role is important and crucial one. There are innumerable shortcomings on supervision & quality assurance’s fronts but one that relates to the sextions & policy frxworks & which from my core of my heart I want that Authorities should act on it as follows: One of the factors for poor inspection standards is the age of Supervision Engineer. Maximum age limit for supervision & quality assurance Engineer (Independent Engineer or Authority’s Engineer) is 65 years which is dangerously leading to lagging in supervision & quality assurance of the project work. For supervision & quality assurance work, it is required to have experience, expertise, qualifications focus, passion, innovation, involvement, excellence, stamina, integrity, zeal & enthusiasms etc.The supervision & inspection Engineer shall discharge its duties in a fair, impartial and efficient manner, consistent with the highest standards of professional integrity and Good Industry Practice. In last 15 years, rapid infrastructure development has taken place & hence there is no dearth of middle age (15 years+) Engineers possessing above experiences to be posted at project sites & having career prospects to do innovation work as well. Retired Govt. Engineers (between 60-65 years) by and large do not posses experience, expertise, focus, passion, innovation, stamina, zeal & enthusiasms etc. Apart from the flawed design, compromise in quality of materials and even lapses on the implementing authority’s part is a regular feature here.
作為一個發(fā)展中國家,印度與其他發(fā)展中國家一樣,交通基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施也在迅速發(fā)展。。這些令人瞠目的建筑縮短了一些地區(qū)的旅行時間,讓商業(yè)變得更容易,并在國家經(jīng)濟層面占據(jù)相當(dāng)大的份額,至少在理論上,這為未來幾十年的增長奠定了基礎(chǔ)。。但作為一名工程師,我關(guān)心的是堅固耐用的交通基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的開發(fā)/建設(shè)。發(fā)展政策的短視正在侵蝕這個國家的橋梁基礎(chǔ)。施工單位的選擇更多是依據(jù)客戶的要求,但是在執(zhí)行上,在監(jiān)督和質(zhì)量保證上,我們的作用是至關(guān)重要的。監(jiān)理和質(zhì)量保證方面存在著無數(shù)的缺陷,但其中一個與選擇和政策框架有關(guān),我從內(nèi)心深處希望有關(guān)部門采取以下行動:其中一個因素檢查標(biāo)準(zhǔn)差是監(jiān)理工程師的年齡。監(jiān)理和質(zhì)量保證工程師(獨立工程師或權(quán)威機構(gòu)的工程師)的最大年齡限制為65歲,這可能導(dǎo)致項目工作的監(jiān)理和質(zhì)量保證的水平跟不上。
監(jiān)理和質(zhì)量保證工作要有經(jīng)驗、有專長、有資格、有激情、有創(chuàng)新、有參與、有優(yōu)秀、有毅力、有誠信、有熱情、有熱情等等,監(jiān)督檢查工程師應(yīng)當(dāng)公平、公正、高效地履行職責(zé),符合最高標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的職業(yè)操守和良好的行業(yè)慣例。在過去的15年中,基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施發(fā)展迅速,因此,擁有上述經(jīng)驗的中年(從業(yè)15年以上)工程師在項目現(xiàn)場任職,并具有從事創(chuàng)新工作的職業(yè)前景。退休的政府工程師(60-65歲)基本上不具備經(jīng)驗、專業(yè)知識、專注力、激情、創(chuàng)新、耐力、熱情和熱情等,導(dǎo)致交通/橋梁基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施效建設(shè)率低下和不耐用。除了有缺陷的設(shè)計之外,材料質(zhì)量上的把關(guān)不嚴(yán),甚至執(zhí)行機構(gòu)方面的失誤,都是一個常見特征。
We have through IBMS (Indian Bridge Management System) National Bridge Inventory which gives the condition of bridges in India. National Bridge Inspection Standards (NBIS) just in line with America which came into being on 1971 & enacted by legislation is needed in India at earliest. Its implementation must be ensured by MoRTH or NHAI. In response to flyover collapse in Kolkatta, Varanasi & catastrophe at other places, a highway act should be added, which should prompt to develop & establish National Bridge Inspection Standards (NBIS) & National Bridge Inspector (NBI) for post construction & National Bridge/Structure supervision standards (NBSS) during construction ( for supervision consultants). There should be National Bridge Implementation Standards (for Owners/Client) which should be primarily aimed to see the speed of the work to avoid time & cost overrun & directly posed to Public & Judicial scrutiny.
我們已經(jīng)從IBMS(印度橋梁管理系統(tǒng))的國家橋梁清單上知道了印度橋梁的狀況。印度最早需要與1971年產(chǎn)生并通過立法頒布的美國相適應(yīng)的橋梁檢驗國家標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。它的實施必須由MoRTH或NHAI來保證。為應(yīng)對加爾各答、瓦拉納西和其他地方的天橋坍塌和災(zāi)難,應(yīng)增加一項告訴公路法的補充說明,這應(yīng)該及時制定和建立國家橋檢驗標(biāo)準(zhǔn)(NBI) &國家檢查員(NBI)郵報建設(shè)國家標(biāo)準(zhǔn)(用)橋/結(jié)構(gòu)監(jiān)督施工(監(jiān)督顧問)。應(yīng)該有國家橋梁實施標(biāo)準(zhǔn)(針對業(yè)主/客戶),主要旨在查看工程的速度,以避免時間和成本超支,并直接面臨公眾和司法審查。
Creation of National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) & its superintendence over all reports & findings should be made. We have Commissioner of Railway Safety (CRS) in case of Railways whose sanctioning is mandatory for opening of any Railway Line or work. NTSB should have same kind of authority. Let us not lose sight of the fact that we are way behind China. Prime Minister Narendra Modi's government has made a pledge to improve India's decaying urban infrastructure through foreign direct investment. The construction industry is the primary beneficiary and - like in many countries - represents one of the most corrupt sectors. Calls for more transparency in campaign contributions are loud and frequent. However, a better place to start would be transparency in the bidding and contract awarding process, including publication of information about not only contractors' qualifications but also their government connections. This practice could expose conflicts of interest and significant failures of accountability. On toll gates, a board should be put up on every large asset, like bridges, flyovers, underpasses etc, mentioning the agency that has constructed the bridge, its age, the contractor's name and which agency is in-charge of its maintenance. Such a board must have contact address and phone numbers of the agency concerned. India suffers from what a government committee in 2011 called a "massive infrastructure deficit in the urban sector". Even if overpasses stand firm, airports sparkle and metro systems hum on schedule, how long will they last? What is the life cycle of India's new urban infrastructure, and what has been secretly compromised in construction and planning processes? Are India's leaders and contractors "building to last"? Our roads, bridges and rail are outdated and need to be fixed. Bihar is having maximum nos. of mega bridges. Can we expect that these bridges will exist in year 2100 & afterwards?
應(yīng)設(shè)立國家運輸安全委員會(NTSB)并監(jiān)督所有報告和調(diào)查結(jié)果。我們有鐵路安全專員(CRS),任何鐵路線路或工程的開通必須得到鐵路安全專員的批準(zhǔn)。國家運輸安全委員會應(yīng)該有同樣的權(quán)力。讓我們不要忽視我們遠遠落后于中國的事實。印度總理莫迪政府承諾通過外國直接投資改善印度日漸衰敗的城市基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施。建筑業(yè)是主要的受益者,就像許多國家一樣,也是最腐敗的部門之一。要求提高競選捐款透明度的呼聲響亮而頻繁。然而,一個更好的起點是投標(biāo)和授予合同過程的透明度,不僅公布承包商的資格,而且公布其政府關(guān)系的信息。這種做法可能暴露出利益沖突和問責(zé)制的重大失誤。
在收費站,應(yīng)在每一個大型資產(chǎn)(如橋梁、立交橋、地下通道等)上設(shè)立一個標(biāo)牌,注明建造橋梁的機構(gòu)、年齡、承包商名稱以及負(fù)責(zé)橋梁維護的機構(gòu)。這樣一個委員會必須有有關(guān)機構(gòu)的聯(lián)系地址和電話號碼。2011年,一個政府委員會稱印度“城市部門存在大規(guī)?;A(chǔ)設(shè)施赤字”。即使天橋屹立不倒,機場閃閃發(fā)光,地鐵系統(tǒng)如期嗡嗡作響,它們還能維持多久?印度新的城市基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的生命周期是多久?在建設(shè)和規(guī)劃過程中,哪些設(shè)施被秘密破壞了?印度的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人和承包商是否“為持久而建”?我們的道路、橋梁和鐵路已經(jīng)過時,需要修繕。比哈爾邦擁有最大數(shù)量的特大橋。我們能指望這些橋在2100年以后繼續(xù)存在嗎?
We must construct, develop & build the infrastructure & thus the nation with “Make In India” mantra but a robust & sustainable infrastructure. Is India Building Bridges to Ruin?
我們必須建設(shè)、發(fā)展基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施,因此,這個有著“印度制造”口號的國家才會擁有強大和可持續(xù)性使用的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施。難道印度正在建造通向毀滅的橋梁嗎?
The main issue hindering progress of mega projects in India is the effective planning. Concept and importance of "Planning" needs to be understood by all stake holders! We shall not fail to plan, lest we may plan to fail! By planning I want to clarify it is pre-construction planning and not planning during construction with Primavera etc The other issue is reliability and accuracy of the DPR based on which bidding and execution are taken up. DPRs are often prepared without putting in required details and without reflecting the site situation. This often leads to cost and time overuns
阻礙印度大型項目進展的主要問題是有效的規(guī)劃。所有利益相關(guān)者都需要理解“規(guī)劃”的概念和重要性!我們不應(yīng)怕計劃失敗而不制定計劃!我想澄清的是,這個規(guī)劃是施工前的規(guī)劃,而不是與Primavera等公司在施工期間的規(guī)劃。另一個問題是,招標(biāo)和執(zhí)行所依據(jù)的DPR的可靠性和準(zhǔn)確性。DPR的編制通常沒有輸入所需的細節(jié),也沒有反映現(xiàn)場情況。這通常會導(dǎo)致成本和時間超支
The decision to buy or create domestic railways is about priorities. If you need capital for an industry and railway is not critical export because you have no chance to displace the incumbent then buy the railway from someone who already has sunk capital and you can enjoy their economy of scale without any investment. And spend your precious capital on an industry where you have an advantage.
購買或創(chuàng)建國內(nèi)鐵路的決定事關(guān)優(yōu)先事項。
如果你需要,資本對于一個工業(yè)和鐵路來說并不是至關(guān)重要,因為你沒有機會取代已經(jīng)發(fā)展起來的人,那么從一個已經(jīng)付出沉沒資本的人那里購買鐵路,你可以享受他們的規(guī)模經(jīng)濟而不需要任何投資。從而把你寶貴的資本花在你有優(yōu)勢的行業(yè)上。
I would love China to come and build a high speed railroad in Texas starting with Austin-San Antonio. China's high speed railway system is impressive.
我希望中國能來得克薩斯,從奧斯汀-圣安東尼奧處開始修建高速鐵路。中國的高鐵系統(tǒng)令人印象深刻。