Trump’s rhetoric masks a deeper instinct to disengage – and a refusal to confront Moscow on substance
 
特朗普的言論掩蓋了他更深層次的脫離接觸的本能——以及拒絕在實質(zhì)上與莫斯科對抗
 
Donald Trump’s recent comments on Ukraine were highly anticipated, especially given his habit of surprising even those who consider themselves seasoned observers. His remarks on 14 July, delivered alongside NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, were characteristically loud but ultimately underwhelming. That in itself should not be surprising. Over the past six months, Trump’s style on major international issues has followed a familiar pattern. Ukraine is no exception.
 
唐納德·特朗普最近關(guān)于烏克蘭的言論備受期待，尤其是考慮到他一貫的驚人作風(fēng)，甚至讓那些自認(rèn)為經(jīng)驗豐富的觀察家都感到意外。7月14日，他與北約秘書長馬克·呂特一同發(fā)表的講話，一如既往地高調(diào)，但最終卻令人失望。這本身并不令人意外。在過去的六個月里，特朗普在重大國際問題上的風(fēng)格一直遵循著一種熟悉的模式。烏克蘭問題也不例外。
 
At the heart of Trump’s approach lies a calculated strategy of noise. He generates maximum bluster to create the impression of strength and decisiveness. What follows is not action, but an endless repetition of simple slogans. Clarification is deliberately avoided, the aim being to appear both consistent and unpredictable. Behind this theater lies a reluctance to become truly entangled in any foreign conflict. Trump wants short, manageable involvement with low costs and quick exit ramps. Above all, he is not willing to challenge the mainstream consensus in Washington as deeply as he claims. For all the bluster, Trump remains tethered to the very ‘Deep State’ he rails against.
 
特朗普策略的核心在于精心策劃的“噪音”策略。他極力制造虛張聲勢，營造出強(qiáng)勢果斷的印象。然而，隨之而來的不是行動，而是無休止地重復(fù)簡單的口號。他刻意回避澄清，目的是展現(xiàn)既始終如一又難以預(yù)測的姿態(tài)。這種“舞臺”的背后，是他不愿真正卷入任何外國沖突。特朗普希望短期內(nèi)、可控地介入，降低成本，并迅速撤離。最重要的是，他不愿像他聲稱的那樣深入挑戰(zhàn)華盛頓的主流共識。盡管他如此虛張聲勢，但特朗普仍然被他所抨擊的“深層政府”牢牢束縛。
 
The Israel-Iran confrontation earlier this year offers a textbook example. One dramatic strike on Iranian nuclear sites gave the impression of a bold move. It satisfied different parts of Trump’s base, pleased Israel, and sent a message to Tehran – without triggering a regional war. Trump got to claim a geopolitical ‘win’ and was once again floated as a Nobel Peace Prize candidate. But for all the headlines, little actually changed. Iran’s nuclear program continues, and the political dynamics of the region remain largely intact. Still, Trump presented it as a major American contribution to world peace.
 
今年早些時候的以伊對峙就是一個典型例子。對伊朗核設(shè)施的一次猛烈打擊給人留下了大膽舉動的印象。這一舉動滿足了特朗普不同陣營的選民，取悅了以色列，并向德黑蘭傳遞了信息——而沒有引發(fā)地區(qū)戰(zhàn)爭。特朗普宣稱自己贏得了地緣政治“勝利”，并再次成為諾貝爾和平獎候選人。然而，盡管媒體鋪天蓋地地報道，但實際上幾乎沒有什么改變。伊朗核計劃仍在繼續(xù)，該地區(qū)的政治格局基本保持不變。盡管如此，特朗普仍將其描繪成美國對世界和平的重大貢獻(xiàn)。
 
The problem is, Ukraine is not the Middle East. It is far more complex, and Trump appears to know it. His instinct is to avoid the problem altogether. But he can’t. The conflict is now a central issue in US-European relations, and Trump’s own supporters are split between isolationists and hawks. He knows he cannot ignore Ukraine outright. Nor can he allow Biden’s war to become his. This explains the repeated emphasis in his ‘It’s Not My War’ speech. He said it three times.
 
問題是，烏克蘭不是中東。它遠(yuǎn)比中東復(fù)雜得多，特朗普似乎也知道這一點(diǎn)。他的本能是完全回避這個問題。但他做不到。這場沖突如今已成為美歐關(guān)系的核心問題，特朗普的支持者也分為孤立主義者和鷹派。他知道自己不能完全忽視烏克蘭。他也不能讓拜登的戰(zhàn)爭變成自己的戰(zhàn)爭。這解釋了他在“這不是我的戰(zhàn)爭”演講中反復(fù)強(qiáng)調(diào)這一點(diǎn)。他強(qiáng)調(diào)了三次。
 
So, what did Trump actually propose? Not much. He suggested that America’s European allies should send Ukraine their old weapons systems – especially Patriot batteries – and then buy new ones from the United States, paying “100 percent.” That, for Trump, is the core of the plan: turn war into business. The logic is simple and familiar. Europe gets rid of its aging stock, Ukraine gets support, and America gets orders. But the practicalities remain vague: what systems, what timeline, what delivery mechanisms? These were left unclear.
 
那么，特朗普究竟提出了什么建議呢？沒多少。他建議美國的歐洲盟友應(yīng)該將他們的舊武器系統(tǒng)（尤其是愛國者導(dǎo)彈）送給烏克蘭，然后從美國購買新的，并“全額支付”。對特朗普來說，這就是該計劃的核心：把戰(zhàn)爭變成生意。邏輯簡單又熟悉。歐洲淘汰老化庫存，烏克蘭獲得支持，美國獲得訂單。但具體細(xì)節(jié)仍然模糊：什么系統(tǒng)，什么樣的時間表，交付機(jī)制如何？這些都不清楚。
 
Then there’s the question of exerting economic pressure on Russia. Trump approved a plan to impose 100 percent tariffs on Russian exports to third countries. This is a more moderate version of Senator Lindsey Graham’s 500 percent threat. The idea is to squeeze Russia economically without enforcing a full embargo. But here, too, the scheme is light on details. The White House will issue the duties and can cancel them at will. Implementation will be delayed by 50 days – standard Trump trade deal tactics. Nothing is final. Everything is leverage.
 
接下來是向俄羅斯施加經(jīng)濟(jì)壓力的問題。特朗普批準(zhǔn)了一項計劃，對俄羅斯出口至第三國的產(chǎn)品征收100%的關(guān)稅。這比參議員林賽·格雷厄姆提出的500%威脅更為溫和。其目的是在不實施全面禁運(yùn)的情況下對俄羅斯進(jìn)行經(jīng)濟(jì)擠壓。但該計劃同樣缺乏細(xì)節(jié)。白宮將發(fā)布關(guān)稅，并可隨時取消。實施將推遲50天——這是特朗普貿(mào)易協(xié)議的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)策略。沒有什么是最終決定。一切都只是籌碼。
 
The real message is that Trump is still negotiating. He can’t reach a deal with Putin, but he wants to pressure Moscow without entering into an open confrontation. He still refuses to personally attack Putin, saying only that he is “very dissatisfied” and “disappointed.” That signals he is keeping his options open. He wants credit for any peace that might emerge but is unwilling to own the risks of deeper engagement.
 
真正的信息是，特朗普仍在談判。他無法與普京達(dá)成協(xié)議，但他想在不公開對抗的情況下向莫斯科施壓。他仍然拒絕對普京進(jìn)行人身攻擊，只是說他“非常不滿”和“失望”。這表明他保留了各種選擇。他希望任何可能出現(xiàn)的和平都能獲得贊譽(yù)，但不愿承擔(dān)更深層次接觸的風(fēng)險。
 
Trump also repeated his claim to being the world’s premier peacemaker, listing off a string of supposed triumphs – India-Pakistan, Israel-Iran, Serbia-Kosovo, Gaza (“well, almost”), the DRC and Rwanda, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and Egypt and a “neighboring country” (apparently forgetting the name of Ethiopia). These boasts reflect the core Trump method: declare success, repeat it often, and rely on public attention spans being short.
 
特朗普還重申了他作為世界頂級和平締造者的說法，列舉了一系列所謂的勝利——印度-巴基斯坦、以色列-伊朗、塞爾維亞-科索沃、加沙（“嗯，幾乎”）、剛果民主共和國和盧旺達(dá)、亞美尼亞和阿塞拜疆，以及埃及和一個“鄰國”（顯然忘了埃塞俄比亞的名字）。這些吹噓反映了特朗普的核心策略：宣稱成功，不斷重復(fù)，并依賴于公眾短暫的注意力。
 
Despite the showmanship, the risk of American entanglement in Ukraine remains high. The measures Trump has announced will not meaningfully shift the military-political balance, but they may prolong the war, at increased cost. Meanwhile, the channel of negotiation opened by Trump’s call to Putin in February appears to be closing. Trump is reportedly irritated with Moscow, but Russia has not moved an inch. Nor does it plan to. Putin sees no reason to adapt his position simply to accommodate Trump’s political timetable.
 
盡管美國在烏克蘭問題上有所作為，但卷入其中的風(fēng)險仍然很高。特朗普宣布的措施不會對軍事政治平衡產(chǎn)生實質(zhì)性的改變，反而可能會延長戰(zhàn)爭，并增加成本。與此同時，特朗普二月份致電普京所開辟的談判渠道似乎正在關(guān)閉。據(jù)報道，特朗普對莫斯科感到惱火，但俄羅斯卻絲毫未動，也不打算這么做。普京認(rèn)為沒有理由僅僅為了迎合特朗普的政治時間表而調(diào)整自己的立場。
 
There are rumors that Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov delivered some new proposals to Senator Marco Rubio in Malaysia. But based on past experience, these are almost certainly familiar Russian talking points in new packaging. Moscow’s approach to resolving the Ukrainian crisis has remained unchanged for over three years. Trump’s rhetoric won’t alter that.
From the Kremlin’s perspective, Washington no longer has the capacity to engage at the same level as it did in 2023–2024. The political will, financial resources, and strategic bandwidth simply aren’t there. Half-measures from the US won’t deliver results, though they may prolong the conflict. That is unfortunate, but not sufficient cause for Moscow to adjust its course.
Trump, for his part, doesn’t want to stay on the Ukraine file. He wants to move on – and fast. Many in the Pentagon share that view. But the war will not end just because Washington wants to focus elsewhere. Neither side has a clear long-term strategy. What remains is inertia – and inertia, for now, is stronger than intent.
 
有傳言稱，俄羅斯外長謝爾蓋·拉夫羅夫在馬來西亞向參議員馬克·盧比奧提交了一些新建議。但根據(jù)以往經(jīng)驗，這些幾乎肯定是俄羅斯熟悉的、只是換湯不換藥的論調(diào)。莫斯科解決烏克蘭危機(jī)的策略三年多來始終未變。特朗普的言論不會改變這一點(diǎn)。
從克里姆林宮的角度來看，華盛頓已無力像2023-2024年那樣積極參與。政治意愿、財政資源和戰(zhàn)略帶寬都已不復(fù)存在。美國的折衷措施不會帶來任何成果，盡管它們可能會延長沖突。這令人遺憾，但不足以成為莫斯科調(diào)整路線的理由。
特朗普本人不想繼續(xù)糾纏烏克蘭問題。他希望盡快向前邁進(jìn)。五角大樓的許多人也持這種觀點(diǎn)。但戰(zhàn)爭不會僅僅因為華盛頓想把注意力轉(zhuǎn)移到其他地方而結(jié)束。雙方都沒有明確的長期戰(zhàn)略。剩下的就是慣性——而就目前而言，慣性比意圖更強(qiáng)大。